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cient, and the orthodox theory, in common with the others mentioned above, must be considered too abstract. For they either study but one side of the problem or, studying both, fail to show their interdependence and mutual adaptation. The judgment as it exists and is used in human experience is what gave us our whole problem. This judgment has two mutually conditioning sides, function and structure; and the problem is not adequately conceived till we study both sides *as* conditioning each other.

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CURRENT MISCONCEPTIONS OF REALISM

THE realistic theory of knowledge has for many years been regarded by professional philosophers as so nearly obsolete as hardly to merit refutation. The rationalistic idealists, following Kant and Hegel, have peacefully debated with the empirical idealists, following Berkeley and Hume, as to whether *esse* was predominantly a matter of *concipi* or of *percipi*, each school paying to the other the implied compliment of treating its doctrine as the only alternative to its own. Quite recently, however, this good-humored rivalry has been disturbed, not only by a vigorous revival of realism on the part of Mr. G. E. Moore and Mr. Bertrand Russell, in England, but also and more noticeably by the coming of the pragmatists. It seems to be a matter of some difficulty to define the principles of this new school in a manner acceptable alike to its adherents and its critics. But perhaps it is safe to say that pragmatism, whatever else it may imply, stands for a protest against interpreting experience in terms that are exclusively cognitive. Existence does not consist primarily either in being perceived or in being conceived, but rather in being felt and willed. *Esse est sentire* and *esse est volutum esse* might serve as mottoes to express the pragmatist's protest against the Berkeleyan and Kantian neglect of the non-cognitive factors of experience.

Now one of the tangible results of the many polemics between this new school and the school of absolute idealism has been a reopening of the supposedly dead issue of natural realism. The pragmatists have been accused by the absolutists of maintaining a too extreme form of subjectivism, and of regarding truth itself as merely the satisfaction of a certain kind of human need. To this charge of subjectivism the pragmatists have made two replies: First, that in identifying logical truth with the psychological and biological processes by which it is pursued and attained, they have checked rather than extended the subjectivism

that has characterized modern philosophy. Cognition or awareness of objects is no condition of their existence, but is rather itself a phenomenon conditioned by the non-cognitive processes of desire and emotion. We can not say that the existence of an emotion consists merely in its being known when cognition itself is shown to depend upon the existence of emotions and needs. Thus in so far as idealism means a reduction of reality to the cognitive activity of a subject, the pragmatist may claim to be anti-idealistic, or realistic. But a second reply that the pragmatist makes to the charge of subjectivism is to bring a counter-accusation against absolutism, of siding with natural realism in so far as it maintains the dualistic belief in an unalterable system of objective truths that subsist independently of the flux of human experience, and that stand in a relation of external correspondence to the judgments made about them in that experience. Thus it is that realism, as a kind of side issue in the debates on pragmatism, has come up for discussion; and as preparatory to such discussion, it seems worth while to protest against certain time-worn misconceptions and caricatures of the realistic theory which it has been the custom of idealists to employ in their perfunctory refutations of that doctrine.

Of these misconceptions I have chosen the three which seem to be most usually held. It is charged, first, that realism is identical with psychophysical dualism or epiphenomenalism, which is the doctrine that consciousness is incapable of producing effects in the world of objects; secondly, that it is identical with metaphysical dualism or the belief that real objects are things in themselves entirely transcending our knowledge and possessing none of the qualities which we attribute to them. The third misconception is the identification of realism with epistemological dualism or the representative theory of knowledge, according to which we can have direct knowledge only of our own ideas, which, as phenomena, are numerically distinct from the real objects which can merely be inferred to exist behind them. Now these three types of dualism are doctrines which individual realists have sometimes held, although no one of them, as I propose to show, is implied by realism as such. Realism in its primary meaning is, I think, generally conceded, both by its defenders and by its opponents, to be the view that things do not depend for their existence upon the fact that we know them, and that consequently they can continue in what is called *existence* during those intervals of time in which no subject is aware of them. It is opposed to idealism only in so far as idealism involves the doctrine of *no object without a subject*. It regards consciousness not as a creator, or sustainer, or even as a necessary correlate of its objects, but rather

as analogous to the light of a candle, which during its brief and intermittent periods of existence illumines the objects over which it plays, thus enabling the owner of the candle to adjust himself more effectually to those objects.

Accepting this as the definition of realism, we have first to inquire into the process of reasoning by which the idealist so often imputes to the realist a belief in psychophysical dualism or the epiphenomenality of consciousness. That reasoning would seem to be somewhat as follows: If the realist is right in thinking that an object is not *directly dependent* upon the fact that it is known, it can not be *indirectly affected* by that fact. For if existence does not depend upon knowledge, knowledge and existence must be sundered from one another by an impassable chasm, and consciousness will thus be forever incapable of effecting any changes in the real world—will be, in short, an epiphenomenon. The briefest answer to the above is to point out that because an object is not dependent directly and at present upon a certain thing, it does not follow that it can not be changed indirectly and in the future by that thing. The absence of direct dependence at one moment does not preclude indirect dependence manifesting itself at another moment. Thus the target does not depend for its existence upon the bullet while the bullet is speeding towards it, but that does not prevent the bullet from changing or, if you like, destroying its existence later on. When changes in an object ensue from a cognition of it, it is usual to suppose that the cognition excites motor currents which affect the muscles and ultimately affect the object that was cognized. What possible reason is there for supposing that realism in virtue of its denial that *esse* is *percipi* must also deny to consciousness the power to affect in this indirect way the objects that are known? And yet if the reader should doubt that any idealist ever has held this misconception, I need only remind him of Professor Royce's well-known criticism of realism, as given in 'The World and the Individual,'¹ and of a recent article by Professor Leighton, in this JOURNAL,² in which he says "realism in *metaphysics* means that the real is wholly external to and independent of thought. . . . In such case cognitive consciousness must be an unaccountable by-product of the cosmic machinery."

I pass now to the second misconception of realism, according to which the realist is supposed to be bound in consistency to believe in metaphysical dualism or in things in themselves, lacking all the qualities possessed by the things of which we are conscious. The

¹ Vol. I, lecture III.

² Vol. III., p. 13.

root of this misconception is to be found in a passage in Berkeley's 'Principles of Knowledge,' in which we are told that the only things that can resemble ideas are ideas, and that if external objects exist independently of our ideas they must of necessity be without color, sound, solidity and extension because these qualities are all ideas or objects that are known. The realistic belief in things numerically outside of consciousness is supposed to imply a belief in things that are, as it were, qualitatively outside consciousness or beyond the scope of thought. Now just as we sometimes find realists who are also epiphenomenalists, so we sometimes find realists who are also agnostics, but it is hard to see how realism as such implies the latter any more than the former of these views. Why should I believe that an object, when I do not perceive it, should exist in any other way than when I do perceive it? There is no reason at all except the axiom of idealism itself to the effect that consciousness is a necessary condition of the forms and qualities as well as of the existence of its objects. This may, of course, be true, but it is at any rate what the realist explicitly denies, for he sees no absurdity in believing that objects do not change their nature when they pass in and out of consciousness. Perhaps, after all, when the idealist attributes to the realist a belief in things that transcend the things of sense, he only means to be very fair and to put the view which he opposes in the least unfavorable light; for from the idealistic standpoint it would be one degree less absurd to believe in the transsubjective existence of unknowables than of knowables. I am inclined to think, however, that the chief source of this misconception lies in the loose use of the word *experience*. This word is a complex term meaning consciousness-of-something. The idealist, however, is prone, on occasion, to forget its complexity and to use the word improperly to denote simply the objects of which we are conscious. Thus when the realist (interpreting the word *experience* in its true sense as the being-conscious-of-objects) denies that reality is confined to experience, the idealist accuses him of introducing mysterious and transcendent entities, and points with pride to the fact that *his* philosophy explains the world without appealing to anything not presented in experience. But to deny that the world is reducible to sensible objects in the relation of consciousness does not imply that the world is not reducible to sensible objects. When we deny that all *A* is *BC*, we do not thereby deny that *A* is *B*.

This second misconception of the realistic position is, like the first, so obvious when once pointed out that to discuss it is to elaborate a truism, and yet, as Mr. G. E. Moore has well shown in his article on 'The Refutation of Idealism,'³ the chief ground for the

³ *Mind*, N. S., No. 53.

idealist's doctrine, and for the peculiar and irritating complacency with which he holds it, is to be found in the axiomatic character which he supposes it to possess on account of the very misconception of which we have been speaking. He feels, that is to say, that because the only objects that we know are the objects which we experience, it must follow as an equally analytic or truistic proposition that the only objects which we know are our experiences. Once let him recognize that experience is not the name for knowable objects simply, but rather for knowable objects only while they are standing in the knowledge relation (*i. e.*, the relation of being apprehended by a subject), which is only one of the many types of relation open to them, and the chance is even that he will admit to the realist that there is at least a possibility of those same objects existing during the intervals when they are *not* standing in that particular relation.

Passing now to the third of these current misconceptions of realism, we find at once considerably more excuse for its existence than for the two already considered. For as almost all of the realists in modern philosophy have happened also to hold the doctrine of epistemological dualism, it is not unnatural that the modern idealist should have confused realism as such with the dualistic or representative theory of knowledge. According to epistemological dualism the only objects that I can certainly know are the modifications of my own mind. Knowledge is true or false according as these subjective objects are good or bad copies of the real external objects which we must infer as their causes. This Cartesian and Lockean dualism seems at first sight quite easy to refute by pointing out (1) that if we could know only ideas or copies of things, we could never know that they were copies, and certainly not whether they were good or bad; and (2) that a real world which never could under any circumstances be perceived is not *the* real world. We are not, however, concerned here with the validity either of dualism itself or of these traditional refutations of it. As a matter of fact, whether self-contradictory or not, the representative theory of perception keeps coming back to plague us in one form or another, perhaps because of its seeming usefulness in psychology and its seeming inevitableness in physics. At any rate, idealism, especially in its later or transcendental forms, has been glad to be allowed a monopoly of the monistic or presentative view of knowledge. For while realism is not of necessity dualistic, idealism is necessarily monistic. All will admit that we can know our own ideas directly or presentatively, and if we hold that the only objects that exist are our own ideas, why, then, the only objects that exist can be known directly and without the treacherous mediation of copies.

Despite all this, it is not difficult to show that idealism has no

necessary monopoly of the monistic epistemology. Common sense, for example, holds that we know directly the very stars and stones themselves, and not mere ideas of them, and it holds that the very same stars and stones that we know do persist unchanged through the hours when we know them not. And could we but solve or postpone the baffling problem of the material mechanism which enables us, in the acts of perception and thought, invisibly to reproject into the transsubjective sphere the objective *quales* previously projected thence upon our sense organs as visible or measurable energy modes, it would be as easy and natural to believe that our sight extended through external space and grasped the real stars as that our hands extend through external space and grasp the real chairs and tables.

Presentative or monistic realism, which might be named 'pan-objectivism' to distinguish it both from dualism and from thoroughgoing idealism or pan-subjectivism, is, in short, by no means self-contradictory, though it is in modern philosophy much less frequently defended, and much more difficult to defend, than the dualistic form of realism. The idealist should not, then, regard a refutation of dualism as equivalent to a refutation of realism. If all of the three dualisms which we have been discussing, viz., psychophysical, metaphysical and epistemological, were abandoned, it would still be possible to hold with the realist that the objects known are not dependent for their existence on the knower, and that consciousness, during the brief moments of its life, expands so as to encircle the things distant in space and time, rather than that the latter contract into mere ideas or states of mind. To say with the idealist that the universe that is known is as small as the knower, is not the same as to say with the monistic realist that the knower can become, while he knows, as large as the universe which he knows. In the one case we insult the universe by reducing it to the dependent status of our own feelings, in the other we console ourselves for the temporary and intermittent nature of our consciousness by the thought that while it lasts it can take us out beyond ourselves into the realm of things that endure.

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DISCUSSION

A REPLY TO MR. PITKIN

MR. PITKIN'S 'reply' to me, on page 44 of the present volume, perplexes me by the obscurity of style which I find in almost all our younger philosophers. He asks me, however, two direct questions which I understand, so I take the liberty of answering.

First he asks: Do not experience and science show 'that countless